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Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
©John A. E. Pottow 2017, 
 University of Michigan Law School 
I. Introduction 
Although mentioned nowhere in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, “fiduciary duties” 
play a central role in guiding the administration of an insolvent debtor’s assets. The chief 
actor doing that administration is the bankruptcy trustee, who is subject to a host of 
duties, some of which are unquestionably fiduciary. One of the greatest challenges a 
bankruptcy trustee faces in the discharge of these duties, however, is the widely divergent 
interests of the heterogeneous creditor constituency. Regarding that difficulty, fiduciary 
duty law offers varying degrees of help to bankruptcy trustees in their unenviable task. 
Even when fiduciary duty law rears its head with respect to these conflicts, disagreement 
is rife in the case law regarding its mandate, with courts often repairing to broad 
platitudes.1 Yet the system still seems to work tolerably, in spite of all this chaos, with a 
pragmatic quasi-implicit recognition that conflicted interests are just endemic to 
bankruptcy. 
This chapter will canvass the bankruptcy trustee’s duties, focusing on the 
fiduciary duties of care and especially loyalty, given these inescapable conflicts. It 
proceeds as follows. First, it offers a bankruptcy law primer on the role of the trustee and 
debtor-in-possession to enable more critical understanding of the fiduciary duty 
discussion to follow. Second, it discusses the trustee’s various duties, focusing first on the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he trustee ‘may not be the representative of any particular creditor, but must 
represent all . . . .’”). 
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degree to which they can be characterized as fiduciary, and then on the specific content of 
the duties of care and loyalty. The exquisite loyalty challenges the trustee faces are 
explored in some depth, broken into a taxonomy of “external” duties to the debtor’s 
estate broadly and “internal” duties to the differing classes of creditors therein (with the 
conflicts of these differing classes illustrated in even greater detail). The analysis shows 
that the help fiduciary duty law can provide is varying. Next, this chapter explains the 
byzantine protective remedies doctrines trustees face from litigation that implicitly 
recognize the difficulty of their task given these conflicts. Finally, it comments upon 
miscellaneous additional duties of the trustee and reflects upon the unique challenges the 
debtor-in-possession faces with its duty of loyalty, suggesting the bankruptcy system has 
pragmatic structural safeguards that not only mitigate some of these tensions but may 
even provide a model for conflict-laden fiduciaries elsewhere.  
II. Bankruptcy Primer 
To understand the various doctrines and rules affecting fiduciary responsibilities 
in bankruptcy, a quick bankruptcy terrain overview is required. One overarching 
consideration at the outset is that bankruptcy law is designed as a collective resolution 
mechanism: it corrals multiple claimants on a debtor’s property into one compulsory 
proceeding, and so much of its design is about centralizing control over unruly creditors 
(and debtors).2 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers several legal consequences in so 
centralizing multiple disputes. First, it imposes an automatic stay on any legal and extra-
                                                 
2 See generally Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) 
(propounding “creditors’ bargain” theory). 
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legal collection activities.3 Second, it creates an “estate” of all the debtor’s property, 
divesting the debtor of control over the res, albeit with title remaining in the debtor’s 
name.4 Third, it assigns control of the estate to the “trustee,” who has authority under 
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to oversee these assets.5 The trustee will be 
the focus of our attention in this analysis of fiduciary duties. 
The Bankruptcy Code also contains various chapters for specific types of 
proceedings. The most relevant include chapters 7, 11, and 13.  
 Chapter 7 is the “primordial” disposition of debtor assets: the trustee’s job is to 
inventory the assets, review claims filed against the estate, carve out exempt assets for 
return to the debtor, and pay out dividends to unsecured creditors based on the liquidation 
of non-exempt property.6 The Code specifies a hierarchy of creditor claims, which can 
generally be grouped into four classes: secured, priority unsecured, general unsecured, 
and subordinated.7   
Chapter 11 is a reorganization proceeding, chiefly for businesses, in which the 
debtor proposes voluntary debt concessions to creditors, who are separated into classes 
and subjected to super-majoritarian voting rules for approving (or vetoing) a plan of 
reorganization.8 (One requirement of chapter 11 is a minimum dividend not falling below 
what would be achieved in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation.9)   
 
                                                 
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
4 Id. § 541. 
5 See id. §§ 702, 704, 1104, 1106, 1302. 
6 See id. §§ 701 et seq. 
7 Id. §§ 506, 507, 510. 
8 Id. §§ 1124, 1129. 
9 Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
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Chapter 13 is a special reorganization for individual debtors, where they may 
propose their own repayment plan spanning three to five years, paying over net income to 
their creditors but retaining all their property—including non-exempt property that 
otherwise would be liquidated in a chapter 7—in exchange for debt discharge at plan 
completion.10 Although the trustee is primarily regulated in chapter 7, separate provisions 
of the Code prescribe special rules for trustees in chapters 11 and 13.11 
The identity of the trustee depends upon under which chapter the debtor files. In 
chapter 7 proceedings, the trustee at the start of the case is technically the “interim” 
trustee, who is selected usually randomly from a panel mostly composed of bankruptcy 
lawyers established by the U.S. Trustee’s Office.12 (The U.S. Trustee is a federal 
Department of Justice official, like the U.S. Attorney, who oversees bankruptcy cases 
proceeding in his or her district and reports to the D.C.-based “Executive Office of the 
United States Trustee” (“EOUST”)).13 Although nominally creditors can vote for a 
trustee, the interim trustee functionally becomes the trustee upon creditor non-vote.14 
 In chapter 13, because the debtor will be languishing in bankruptcy for three to 
five years, control of property stays with the debtor, who revests in the estate property 
upon plan confirmation.15 There is also an officer, also appointed by the U.S. Trustee, 
called the “Standing Trustee” for the district.16 As a logistical matter, the debtor’s 
                                                 
10 Id. §§ 1325, 1328. 
11 See id. §§ 704, 1106, 1302.  
12 Id. §§ 322(b)(1), 701. 
13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581, 586; 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.1 et seq. 
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702. 
15 Id. § 1327(b). 
16 28 U.S.C. § 586(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1302. 
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monthly payments are funneled through the Standing Trustee’s Office, although some 
secured creditors (e.g., mortgagees) are often paid directly, “outside” the plan.17 
In chapter 11, U.S. law demonstrates its remarkable vision, subject to increasing 
global replication: the “Debtor in Possession” (“DIP”) concept.18 Under the DIP model, 
no trustee is appointed; the debtor remains in control of its property and its estate, vesting 
in most—but importantly not all—of the trustee’s responsibilities.19 There is some debate 
in bankruptcy literature whether the DIP is a separate entity from the debtor or just the 
debtor with additional responsibilities and powers, but the point remains that the DIP runs 
the show.20 Under certain circumstances, the DIP can be displaced and an external trustee 
appointed (generally known as a debtor “out of possession”), but those cases are rare.21 
The U.S. experience serves as marked contrast to many other systems of insolvency, such 
as U.K. “administration,” in which the first thing that happens upon filing is divestiture of 
authority of debtor’s management and appointment of the British analogue to a trustee.22 
One final point in this bankruptcy law primer: the trustee (and DIP in chapter 11) 
enjoys special powers under federal bankruptcy law usually referred to as “avoiding 
powers.” Generally, federal bankruptcy law takes state law property and contract rights as 
it finds them, although subject to an important caveat of countervailing federal 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., In re Clay, 339 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (describing process). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 1107. 
19 Id. § 1106. 
20 See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 
11, 38 Wayne L. Rev. 1323, 1331 (1992) (chronicling growing “resistance” to new entity 
theory). 
21 11 U.S.C. § 1104. (These appointment criteria focus specifically on the beneficiaries of 
the estate, not broader considerations of public interest.) 
22 Insolvency Act 1986 c. 45, Schedule B1, ¶¶ 1, 10, 59(1), 61, and 64 (UK). 
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bankruptcy purposes.23 That said, the Code confers various instances of redistributive 
power that allow trustees to claw back some transactions. For example, an unsecured 
creditor who receives an eve-of-bankruptcy (usually ninety days) transfer of debtor 
property that allows a better payout than would otherwise be achieved through pro rata 
distribution has received a “voidable preference,” which the trustee can choose to rescind 
for the benefit of the estate.24 Thus, DIPs in chapter 11 can suddenly find themselves 
armed with powers to undo transactions with their creditors pursuant to laws that exist 
only in federal bankruptcy cases.   
One of the most significant of these powers pertaining to payment status is what is 
colloquially called the “strong-arm” clause, which allows trustees to pick off unperfected 
liens on estate collateral.25 A flawed security interest, if avoided under the strong-arm 
power, has the lien transferred to the estate with the consequence of rendering the 
erstwhile secured creditor a general unsecured creditor, entitled only to whatever meager 
dividend that trickles down to the unwashed.26 The strong-arm clause implicates a classic 
internal duty of loyalty tension that will be discussed in the following part. 
III. Trustee Duties 
A. Classification: Fiduciary, Non-Fiduciary, and Anti-Fiduciary 
Obligations 
The trustee faces a congeries of duties under the Bankruptcy Code, which 
contains a fulsome list of responsibilities under section 704 (a provision too long to 
                                                 
23 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 547. 
25 Id. § 544. 
26 Id. § 550. 
6
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 135 [2018]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/135
 7 
reproduce here).27 None of these are explicitly described as “fiduciary,” but 
commentators have previously argued that at least some are. For example, retired 
bankruptcy judge (and frequent author) Steven Rhodes divides trustees’ obligations into 
“fiduciary” obligations, owed to the “bankruptcy court and the parties in cases in which 
the trustee serves,” and “institutional” obligations, owed “to the bankruptcy process 
itself,” a serviceable if slightly overbroad typology.28 While I agree with Rhodes that 
only some are fiduciary, I think analyzing the other obligations is equally as important 
because some are not just neutral, but thrust trustees into an antagonistic posture with the 
natural beneficiaries to whom they owe a duty of loyalty. Thus, my preferred sorting 
would be to say that the trustee has fiduciary, non-fiduciary, and (at the risk of being 
insufferable) “anti-fiduciary” obligations under the Code. 
i. Non-Fiduciary Duties 
Let’s start with non-fiduciary duties. Although one can debate the correct labeling 
and classification, some obligations, while important, are clearly not fiduciary. For 
example, furnishing notice to certain domestic support creditors or transferring patients to 
health care facilities falls toward the ministerial/administrative end of a continuum 
building up to fiduciary obligations.29 
ii. Fiduciary Duties 
                                                 
27 11 U.S.C. § 704. Section 704 is not exhaustive. The trustee has myriad other 
obligations scattered throughout other Code provisions. See, e.g., id. § 341. 
28 Steven W. Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006). Others use different labels. 
Elizabeth H. McCullough, Bankruptcy Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in the 
Madness?, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 153, 162 (2011) (labeling some “functionary”). 
29 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(10), (12). 
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As for what I would consider fiduciary duties, the absence of an explicit label of 
“fiduciary” does not undermine the Code’s language that is clearly amenable to trigger 
such responsibility, such as the obligation “to be accountable for all property received.”30 
Even neutral-sounding assignments, such as the primary instruction to “collect and 
reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves,” can be 
interpreted—as this one indeed has by courts—to impress upon trustees a fiduciary role.31 
The corollary is that some obligations that might sound like they are fiduciary “in 
the air” are not, upon closer inspection, in light of the trustee’s primary obligation to 
administer an estate. Consider perhaps the most vivid one from the debtor’s 
perspective—the obligation “if advisable, to oppose the debtor’s discharge.”32 One could 
conceive of this as yet another obligation of the trustee to help creditors, and so fully 
consonant with the trustee’s role as a fiduciary to creditors seeking collection. But that 
analysis is too quick, because the trustee has no obligation to improve the general welfare 
of creditors (they are not his general wards), nor even to cajole the debtor to offer 
voluntary repayments to creditors whose debts will be discharged by operation of federal 
law.   
Rather, the trustee has a fiduciary obligation to creditors limited to the property of 
the estate; what the debtor does in a post-bankruptcy world is of no concern to the trustee. 
By contrast, creditors may well care, because a debtor whose discharge is denied not only 
contributes bankruptcy estate property to the creditors but also continues to have a legal 
                                                 
30 Id. § (a)(2). 
31 Id. § (a)(1). See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 
1, 12 (2000). Cf. Unif. Trust Code § 809 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2000) (duty to control trust 
property). 
32 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6). 
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obligation to pay post-bankruptcy. On the other hand, creditors with an uncollectible 
debtor don’t want their dividends reduced by the trustee’s (estate-compensated) public-
spirited pursuit of a discharge denial motion that yields them no more money. The trustee 
is thus given specific discretion to determine whether discharge opposition is “advisable,” 
which some courts have interpreted to mean the trustee can let a discharge investigation 
drop if the creditors don’t care (or have settled with the debtor for a compromise 
payment), while others have held an objection cannot be dropped if creditors have been 
bought off (at the very least, say these courts, it must be reported to the U.S. Trustee’s 
Office).33 “No-drop” courts clearly rely on something beyond a trustee’s fiduciary 
obligation to creditors, making the trustee a hybrid fiduciary/non-fiduciary to creditors 
under section 704.34 Thus, some obligations might be considered “faux fiduciary.” 
iii. Anti-Fiduciary Duties 
But non- (or faux-) fiduciary obligations are not the end of the matter, as some 
obligations are clearly antithetical to the creditors, the ostensible beneficiaries of the 
trustee’s fiduciary duties. These might be considered “anti-fiduciary.” Consider section 
704(a)(4)’s instruction that “if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and 
                                                 
33 Compare In re Dalen, 259 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001) (approving) with 
In re Levine, 287 B.R. 683, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002) (disapproving). See generally 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, Handbook for Chapter 7 
Trustees § 4.G, 29 (2002), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter07/docs/forms/Ch7hb0702-
2005.pdf [hereinafter Handbook] (“If the trustee has information that would support an 
objection to discharge but deems such an action inadvisable, the trustee should promptly 
bring such facts to the attention of the United States Trustee.”). 
34 See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 202–09 (opining trustees must “protect the integrity of 
the bankruptcy process”). 
9
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object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.”35 Few creditors relish the prospect 
of the trustee sniffing around their claims, let alone objecting, which situates the usually 
supportive trustee in a sometimes adversarial posture. This necessary awkwardness 
underscores the intrinsically conflicting nature of the multi-party nature of bankruptcy: 
when there is collective resolution of a debtor’s general default, a menagerie of 
heterogeneous creditors emerges. A creditor whose claim objection is sustained gets less 
money, which trickles down to other co-creditors. Trustees thus find themselves 
sometimes opposed to creditors they normally champion.36 
 Appreciating the complexity of the trustee’s duties, which are sometimes 
downright anti-fiduciary in my characterization, do bankruptcy courts nonetheless 
generally tend to consider them on the whole as triggering fiduciary obligations? 
Absolutely. Courts repeatedly remark that trustees—and hence chapter 11 DIPs—are 
“fiduciaries” who owe traditional obligations of care and loyalty to the estate and its 
creditors.37 Even the professional canons concede many trustee obligations are 
fiduciary.38 Accordingly, while noting these complex nuances on the trustee’s 
responsibilities, it is appropriate now to consider the primary duties of care and loyalty 
                                                 
35 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(4). 
36 The conflict is only relevant in “intermediate” cases with some unsecured distribution. 
If the estate is solvent and all creditors are getting fully paid, only the debtor cares about 
claims inflation, not the trustee. And if the estate has no assets, the trustee also should not 
care about the proper calculation of claims that will all be discharged without payment 
anyway. (The only reason for pursuing review of claims in no asset cases would be 
trustee fee-churning. In re Riverside-Linden Investors, 925 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 
1991).) Courts have settled on a pragmatic “prima facie” standard: if a claim looks prima 
facie appropriate, there is no further investigation required absent party objection. E.g., In 
re Atcall, 284 B.R. 791, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
37 E.g., Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd., 376 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2004). 
38 See NABT Canon of Ethics, Canon 2 (2005). 
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and how they constrain the trustee, flagging especially how the structural tension of the 
trustee as fiduciary/anti-fiduciary manifests itself when beneficiary interests conflict.39 
B. Content of the Duty of Care: Relative Clarity 
As mentioned, characterization of trustee duties as “fiduciary” does not appear in 
the Code, and so it is unsurprising the statute lacks explication of the duty of care.40 
Indeed, bankruptcy courts repeatedly reference non-Code “general” provisions of 
fiduciary duty law, suggesting trustees are governed by a federal common law. The 
Supreme Court has pronounced, “By the common law, every trustee or receiver of an 
estate has the duty of exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate.”41 
This common law standard, drawing from trust law, has been articulated as that required 
by “an ordinarily prudent person.”42 
Common law fiduciary duties of care supplement statutory obligations imposed 
by the Code. Courts emphasize section 704 as a floor, not a ceiling, to the proper 
discharge of bankruptcy trustees qua fiduciaries. “Beyond the statutory duties, 
bankruptcy trustees owe to the beneficiaries of the estate the usual common law trust 
duties . . . .”43 Because the content of the duty of care is federal common law, courts have 
turned to general principles, such as the Restatement of Trusts, to delineate its content.44 
                                                 
39 Some cases hold corporate DIPs only to a business judgment rule duty of care, e.g., In 
re Mirant Corp., 348 B.R. 725, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006), but this line has been 
criticized. See Kelch, supra note 20, at 1342 n.88. 
40 Trust law prefers “prudence.” See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 77 (Am. Law Inst. 
2003) (duty of “prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care”). 
41 United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938). 
42 In re Ebel, 338 B.R. 862, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005). 
43 In re Markos Gurnee P’ship, 182 B.R. 211, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). 
44 See, e.g., In re Ferrante, 51 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1995). 
11
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(There are, however, some dissenters.45) Finally, it should be noted that duty of care 
issues are functionally regulated by the statutory “competence” requirement for trustees 
under the Code.46 Thus, the real work typical duty of care litigation performs in regular 
trust law is probably done offstage in insolvency, such as by the empaneling procedures 
of the U.S. Trustee’s office and administrative proceedings removing trustees,47 which 
are designed to police competence.48 As such, duty of care cases raise few noteworthy 
issues in insolvency law.49 
C. Content (and Beneficiaries) of the Duty of Loyalty: Relative Chaos 
The duty of loyalty raises far more complex (and intractable) issues in 
bankruptcy. As mentioned above, bankruptcy raises unique conflicts among claimants, all 
of whom are ostensibly served by the trustee. The thornier those conflicts get, the less 
certainty the fiduciary duty of loyalty (or even impartiality) seems to provide courts. In 
considering these trustee’s loyalty difficulties, it might be helpful first to distinguish 
“external” from “internal” conflicts of trustee loyalty. 
i. External Conflicts: (Mostly) Clear Fiduciary Obligations 
                                                 
45 See In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to supplement text of 
the Code).  
46 11 U.S.C. § 321(a). 
47 See 28 C.F.R. § 58.6; Case No. 05-0004, Decision by Acting Director Clifford J. White 
III, 6 (Nov. 1, 2005) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/admin_decisions/docs/case050004.htm 
(four-month suspension for inadequate debtor investigation). 
48 See In re Lowery, 215 B.R. 140, 141–42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding trustee 
“obviously” competent “by virtue of being a member of the United States Trustee’s 
panel”). 
49 Cf. Kelch, supra note 20, at 1340 (“In attempting to find . . . a definition of the content 
of the fiduciary duty of the debtor in possession, the lack of any unified concept becomes 
evident.”). 
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By “external” conflicts, I mean adversarial conflicts between a trustee himself and 
the bankruptcy estate stakeholders. For example, a self-dealing trustee who profits on his 
own account violates a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries.50 To guard against such 
temptations, the Code explicitly requires “disinterestedness” as an eligibility criterion to 
serve.51 This statutory requirement replicates the common law of trusts,52 and Congress 
provides extensive (and fairly rigid) definitional guidance on disinterestedness.53 Even 
criminal law is implicated.54 
Case law, however, has glossed some flexibility on this statutory definition. 
Trustees, for example, can serve in multiple related estates under certain circumstances, 
even if there is a potential for cross-claims.55 And trustees can, and often do, employ 
themselves as lawyers for the bankruptcy estate.56 (The requirement of disinterestedness 
also applies to attorneys who seek to serve the estate, beyond whatever constraints are 
imposed by apposite rules of professional conduct.57) The DIP, of course, could never 
satisfy the disinterestedness test, and so has no requirement of disinterestedness 
                                                 
50 See In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R. 413, 423 (D.P.R. 1987), aff'd in part and rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 847 F.2d 931, 950 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that trustee’s 
relative’s freebie marriage reception on estate property was “self-dealing” and “conflict 
of interest”). 
51 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
52 In re Palm Coast, Matanza Shores Ltd. P’ship, 101 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 154. 
55 See, e.g., In re Petters Co., Inc., 401 B.R. 391, 412 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (citing Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 2009(c)(2)). Trust law provides analogous flexibility. See Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. (c)(7) (Am. Law Inst. 2003). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 327(d); see also Rhodes, supra note 28, at 161 n.67 (referencing poll where 
78% of trustees reported employing themselves under section 327(d)); Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. (c)(5) (Am. Law Inst. 2003) (condoning self-employment). 
57 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
13
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imposed.58 In sum, the duty of loyalty for “external” temptations to the trustees is largely 
what might be expected, perhaps with some over-specificity accorded by the statutory 
strictures of the Code. Fiduciary duty law (trusts) robustly supplements the Code, aided 
by the administrative apparatus of the EOUST. 
ii. Internal Conflicts: Divided Case Law with Uncertain Fiduciary 
Obligations 
 “Internal” loyalty issues raise different concerns that, if not unique, are somewhat 
intrinsic to insolvency: how the trustee polices competing conflicts among the 
constitutive beneficiaries he serves. Three illustrative skirmishes demonstrate the 
difficulties courts have deploying the duties of loyalty and impartiality regarding the 
trustee’s divergent beneficiaries: secured creditor vs. unsecured creditor, unsecured 
creditor vs. unsecured creditor, and creditors generally vs. the debtor. 
To start, the trustee is supposed to be “impartial,” in the language of trust law: 
A Chapter 7 trustee occupies a unique position. He is charged with 
impartially administering the estate entrusted to him. He is the 
representative of all the creditors . . . . At times he must propose action 
that may be detrimental to particular creditors or oppose requests that may 
be favorable to others.59   
 
Thus, bankruptcy judges are sympathetic to the competing demands on trustee loyalties. 
But this sympathy has not resulted in detailed specification in case law, just vague 
incantations of impartiality. And trust law’s translation of the duty of impartiality into 
not, in fact, requiring impartiality but rather “due regard” for the divergent interests of 
                                                 
58 Cf. id. § 1104(b) (permitting DIP’s professionals to have previously represented 
debtor). 
59 In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 268 B.R. 468, 473 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) 
(holding Code requires “balance”). 
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beneficiaries has not been picked up in bankruptcy (although I am doubtful it could offer 
much help).60 Rather, judicial solicitude for the trustee’s plight simply manifests itself in 
the diffuse generalization of the trustee’s fiduciary duties being owed to “the estate.”61 
The Supreme Court concurs that, in insolvency, a corporate DIP’s fiduciary duties run 
expansively to “the corporation,” including its shareholders and its creditors.62 As one 
commentator laments, “[T]he fiduciary duty that adheres to this role of debtor in 
possession is a broad one with a host of beneficiaries. It is the number and diversity of 
beneficiaries of this fiduciary duty that causes its undoing as a useful concept for analysis 
for conduct.”63 
1. Secured Creditors 
Notwithstanding this broad obligation to maximize the interests of everyone, there 
are repeat scenarios in which constituencies conflict, and bankruptcy law has struggled to 
                                                 
60 See Robert H. Sitkoff and Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Cases and 
Materials 667 (10th ed. 2005). Trust law’s duty of impartiality is implicated mostly in the 
principal-vs.-income beneficiaries tension. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79 (Am. 
Law Inst. 2003) (imposing “duty to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with 
respect to the various beneficiaries of the trust”); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 232 
(Am. Law Inst. 1959) (“Impartiality Between Successive Beneficiaries”). My skepticism 
of its utility to bankruptcy is that in trust law (a) there are generally fewer stakeholders, 
and (b) a frequent workaround of explicit specification in the trust document itself of 
rules for resolving/absolving conflicting duties. See also Unif. Trust Code § 803 (Unif. 
Law Comm’n 2010) (“Duty of Impartiality”); Scott and Asher on Trusts § 17.15 (5th ed. 
1995) (“Duty of Impartiality”).  
61 See, e.g., In re JMW Auto Sales, 494494 B.R. 877, 893 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013). 
62 CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (“The fiduciary duty of the trustee runs 
to shareholders are well as creditors. . . . One of the painful facts of bankruptcy is that the 
interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors.”). Note even 
the Supreme Court’s vacillation between shifting exclusively to creditors vs. shifting 
diffusely to creditors in addition to shareholders. As one of the bankruptcy bar’s senior 
statesmen observes, the corporate board retains residual duties even when a chapter 11 
trustee is appointed. Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the 
Debtor in Possession’s Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 543, 547 (1992).  
63 Kelch, supra note 20, at 1336. 
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apply “winners” of the fiduciary duty. Consider the tension immanent in the strong-arm 
clause and its consequences for the trustee’s duty of loyalty. This avoiding power pits 
secured creditor against unsecured creditor, both apparent beneficiaries of the trustee’s 
loyalty. Moreover, an unsecured creditor generally lacks standing to pursue an avoidance 
action. Thus, only if the trustee decides to move forward will the secured creditor be at 
risk. Why should a trustee expend time and effort litigating against one beneficiary for 
the benefit of another (more likely, others)?64  
Nothing in the Code dictates an obligation to do so other than the general 
command to examine claims,65 which could subsume an obligation to examine the 
perfected status of a secured claim. Yet case law has created just such a duty, albeit 
tempered. Indeed, most cases considering the matter do not see secured and unsecured 
creditors as equal subjects of the trustee’s protections. On the contrary, they say that 
secured creditors can look out for themselves, and thus the trustee’s “primary” obligation 
is to unsecured creditors.66 This approach is tempered, however, by a plausibility 
threshold, suggesting the trustee’s obligation is not to rack up fees scouring every single 
lien on the estate, but only when some initial indicia of litigability is raised. The 
bankruptcy rules reflect this thinking.67 (Of course, this tempering of the trustee’s 
                                                 
64 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (tying trustee’s compensation to recovery). 
65 Id. § 704(a)(5). 
66 In re Dinh, 80 B.R. 819, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987) (“[I]t is a fundamental concept 
in bankruptcy that a trustee’s primary duty is to the unsecured creditors rather than to the 
secured creditors. The secured creditors, for the most part, should be able to look to their 
collateral for satisfaction of their claims.”); In re Schwen’s, Inc., 19 B.R. 681, 694 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (“Secured creditors have a duty to and responsibility to monitor 
the bankruptcy proceedings and to keep informed of the action taken with respect to 
property in which they claim an interest.”).   
67 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). 
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obligation is coupled with an unsecured creditors committee in chapter 11, which has a 
greater watchdog role in policing the conduct of the “trustee” that is a DIP.68) The 
corollary, then, is that if the validity of a secured creditor’s perfected status is doubtful, 
the trustee, acting for the unsecured creditors, should object. 
 The strong-arm clause perhaps is a special case: what’s the point of having the 
strong-arm avoiding power that only the trustee has standing to implement if the trustee 
has no fiduciary obligation to use it?69 But the case law talking about the trustee’s 
“primary” duty to the unsecured creditors and not the secureds is far from limited to the 
strong-arm clause. Another area in which the trustee’s obligations to a secured creditor 
arise involves the maintenance and preservation of collateral.70 Recall that the bankruptcy 
estate comprises all property of the debtor, even that fully encumbered by consensual 
lien. Why would a trustee want to hold onto such property, let alone incur expenses to 
maintain it? The short answer is, he doesn’t, and, indeed, often abandons it back to the 
secured creditor (if the secured creditor doesn’t beat him to the punch with a lift-stay 
motion).71 But unless and until that happens, the secured creditor cannot take the property 
back without violating the automatic stay.72 
                                                 
68 11. U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103. 
69 Cf. In re Pearson Indus., 178 B.R. 753, 767 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1995) (no duty to pursue 
voidable preference absent benefit to estate); see generally In re Nettel Corp., 364 B.R. 
433, 441–42 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (taking capacious definition of “estate” to include 
secured creditor). 
70 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2). 
71 Id. §§ 362(d), 554. 
72 See, e.g., In re Burns, 503 B.R. 666, 673–75, 680 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (holding 
refrigerator repossession willful violation of stay warranting emotional distress and 
punitive damages). 
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 So what happens in the interim if the property requires upkeep? Consider a 
property insurance premium: should the trustee pay it? If the estate is deeply insolvent, 
perhaps even to the point where recovery of the trustee’s own fees are in question, there 
is no incentive to waste scarce funds on collateral that will not generate any return to the 
estate (recall the trustee himself takes fees out of the estate). Congress has included 
section 506(c) to allow the trustee to “surcharge” the collateral with such expenses, 
exactly to combat this economic disincentive.73 But section 506 does not answer the 
question of fiduciary duty. While the question might be seen as pertaining to the duty of 
care (Does the trustee have to do X?), it really is a question of the duty of loyalty (Does 
the trustee have to do X for Y?).74 Section 506 simply states what to do if the trustee does 
incur the cost of the premium. But it doesn’t answer the fiduciary question: must the 
trustee act because of his fiduciary duty to the secured creditor?75 
Some courts have said so. “Procuring insurance would ordinarily be an integral 
part of the trustee’s duty [to secured creditors].”76 They build upon general principles that 
the “fiduciary duty [flows] to all creditors, not just the unsecured creditors.”77 On the 
other hand, contrary cases pick favorites and hold that although the duty extends to all 
                                                 
73 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (requiring “benefit” to secured creditor of incurred expenses). 
74 Substantial case law holds that the trustee is not supposed to represent any individual 
creditor, but the collective. See, e.g., In re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc., No. 10-34499, 
2015 WL 5766761 at *4 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 30, 2015) (holding trustee pursuing 
adversary proceeding must represent all creditors or no creditors but may 
not represent only some). Relatedly, the trustee has no obligation to “save” individual 
creditors and indeed must object to late-filed claims. See, e.g., In re Lyon, No. 11-50343, 
2011 WL 5299229, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. Nov. 2, 2011). 
75 Cf. Sitkoff & Dukeminier, supra note 60, at 595 (“Difference Between Power and 
Duty”). 
76 In re Kinross Mfg. Corp., 174 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994). 
77 In re Troy Dodson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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creditors, the “primary duty” is to fight for the unsecured creditors and not the secured 
creditors.78 Thus, some have held precisely the opposite: when no value will to flow to 
the estate (as the secured creditor will reap all the collateral’s benefit), the trustee has no 
duty to expend estate funds to procure insurance. “The secured creditor must exercise 
reasonable diligence to protect the property serving as security. The trustee must also 
exercise diligence to conserve the assets of the bankruptcy estate, but he is not relegated 
to the role of ‘babysitter’ for the secured creditors.”79 These courts believe the secured 
creditor can just as easily—more easily, in fact—pay the premium if it wants the 
collateral to be insured.80 In sum, whatever the jurisprudential platitudes about trustees 
being fiduciaries to “all creditors,” when loyalty-dividing issues of secured creditor vs. 
unsecured creditors arise, it seems that some fiduciary conflicts are resolved in favor of 
unsecured creditors on the backs of the secureds, with many courts unapologetically 
touting the trustee’s “primary” obligation toward the unsecureds. One court has gone so 
far to call secured creditors “the trustee’s statutory adversaries.”81 
Normative theory is sadly beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few quick 
explanations for this jurisprudential line of beneficiary stratification present themselves. 
On a redistributive impulses level, it could be that bankruptcy judges generally favor the 
unsecured creditor as the “little guy,” given the numerous Code provisions that treat 
                                                 
78 Some go so far to abjure any duty to secureds. See, e.g., In re NETtel Corp., Inc., 364 
B.R. 433, 441 (Bankr. D.C. 2006) (holding trustee’s fiduciary obligations “run only to a 
debtor’s unsecured creditors.”). 
79 In re Dinh, 80 B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987). 
80 See In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. 865, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding otherwise 
“would shift the Trustee’s role from custodian to investment manager thereby 
encouraging secured creditors to avoid the responsibility for their investments”).  
81 In re J.F.D. Enterprises, 223 B.R. 610, 628 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998). 
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secured credit so favorably;82 they believe that otherwise hapless unsecureds need all the 
help they can get (or, more precisely, in a near-zero-sum distributive bankruptcy world, 
the secured creditors don’t need the trustee’s help as much as a zealous fiduciary). Or it 
could be an armchair empirical assumption that unsecured creditors of an insolvent estate 
are often the “residual claimants,” and hence the fulcrum class to whom the trustee’s 
obligations ought be owed in cases of inter-creditor conflict. This assumption has been 
rightly questioned.83 For example, it is more likely to be true in consumer cases than in 
uncertain corporate valuation cases. Whatever the justification, a strand of fiduciary law 
may be emerging: the trustee is “more beneficial” for unsecured creditors than secured.84 
But it is contested. 
2. Priority Unsecured Creditors 
Slicing the bologna even finer, what happens when there are conflicts among 
unsecured creditors inter se? Section 507 accords special priority to certain unsecured 
creditors’ claims.85 Does the trustee have an obligation to investigate these claims, too, 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 1129(b)(1). 
83 See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1390 (2007) (“We would be astonished to hear that 
VISA has claimed a breach of fiduciary duty when one of its subprime customers started 
a risky new business or took up skydiving.”). Hu and Westbrook also challenge the 
casual assumption that corporate creditors prefer less risky investment decisions than 
stockholders. Id. at 1351. 
84 The ostensible “duty” to maximize distributions is not found in section 704’s duty list. 
The Supreme Court in Weintraub talked about the trustee’s “seeking to maximize the 
value of the estate,” CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985), which the Seventh 
Circuit economically glosses as maximizing “net assets” after considering collection 
costs. In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995). It receives mention 
in the trustee’s handbook. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 168 n.92. Trust law has more 
nuanced treatment (and history) on “prudent investor” rules, including a specific model 
law. E.g., Uniform Prudent Investor Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 1994).   
85 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
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perhaps to uncover whether priority assertions are trumped-up? Or may the trustee take a 
passive role unless and until someone pipes up? Here, the case law is scanter, so I 
reached out to some bankruptcy judges, trustees, and counsel for anecdotal guidance. I 
am informed that while the issue doesn’t arise frequently and that many overworked 
trustees usually just take claims as given if nobody fusses, occasionally trustees do dig in 
on a bold creditor proclamation of priority status. One sage colleague who has worked as 
a trustee in complex cases for decades said this:  
As to priority claims, I have to object to a number of claims in which the 
creditor alleges priority. An unsecured creditor will often file as a priority 
claim hoping that I will miss the lack of priority. Wage claimants will 
often overstate their priority when wages are generally limited to priority 
for ninety days prior to filing. Usually I am the person filing a claim 
objection because of claimed priority or as an administrative expense 
claim.86 
 
Why would there not be the same enthusiasm to go after priority creditors as 
secured creditors? If the theoretical foundation for the rule that unsecured creditors get 
“primary” trustee loyalty over secured creditors is the unsecured creditors’ occupation as 
the fulcrum class of residual claimants, then one would expect an equal application to 
general unsecureds when a conflict is with a priority unsecured: the trustee should 
presumably look out for residual claimants and fight the priority claim. Yet this does not 
seem to be uniformly the case, at least based on my anecdotal survey, which might be 
evidence for the judicially favored redistribution hypothesis. Many priority unsecured 
                                                 
86 Email from Christopher Redmond, Esq., Partner, Husch Blackwell, to author (June 14, 
2017, 8:45 EST) (on file with author). Chris estimates claims objection incidence as 95% 
of the time the trustee, 4% the debtor, and 1% some other party (e.g., another creditor). 
Id. This obligation to kick the beneficiary’s tires might surprise trust lawyers; it stems 
from a deep-rooted bankruptcy norm of pro rata distribution. 
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creditors are from disempowered constituencies (domestic support, employees, etc.).87 Or 
perhaps simply trustees remember that they, too, receive priority repayment!88 The point 
is that once again, fiduciary duty law is doing limited work, with no uniform case law on 
how to resolve these conflicts. 
3. Debtor 
Finally, conflicts between creditors and the debtor seem to run in the opposite 
direction. Here, cases repeatedly hold that the trustee’s fiduciary loyalty does not flow to 
the debtor, even though technically the debtor is the estate’s ultimate residual 
beneficiary.89 For example, even though not in the trustee’s list of responsibilities under 
section 704, courts have created a trustee duty to scrutinize (and if indicated, object to) 
the debtor’s exemptions.90 This cannot be explained away by the Code’s instruction to 
trustees to object when advisable to the debtor’s discharge,91 because trustees have an 
equal if not more explicit statutory instruction to examine creditors’ claims.92 Courts 
upholding this obligation candidly admit it comes indirectly from the Code, gamely 
trying various hooks.93 The weak statutory foundations mean that courts are driven by 
                                                 
87 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), (a)(3). 
88 Id. § (a)(2). Note that the compensation structure for trustees incentivizes recoveries 
for the unsecured creditors, with no special treatment for priority. See id. § 326(a); cf. id. 
§ 507(a)(1)(C) (special trustee priority for domestic support creditors). 
89 Id. § 726. 
90 In re Dreibelbis, No. 14-61483, 2015 WL 3536102, at *4 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2015) 
(calling duty “routine”). 
91 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6). 
92 Id. § 704(a)(5). 
93 In re Bell, 225 F.3d 203, 221 (“The duty to review and, if necessary object to, claimed 
exemptions is nowhere specifically mentioned—although it is subsumed within the 
general duty to ‘investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.’” (quoting § 707(a)(4)); see 
also In re Edmonston, 107 F.3d 74, 76–77 (1st Cir. 1997) (referencing § 707(a)(1)’s 
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what they see as the trustee’s duty to unsecured creditors, and to work for unsecured 
creditors against the debtor when their interests disalign. At least sometimes, therefore, 
conflicting demands on a trustee’s loyalty are not so difficult to resolve: the debtor 
loses.94 Fiduciary duty, however, is not guiding, but providing constructed ex post 
justification, for resolution of this conflict. 
iii. Debtor-in-Possession Redux: A Pragmatic Refocus? 
The foregoing loyalty discussion has considered the typical chapter 7 case with an 
appointed trustee. The chapter 11 (DIP) context presents a noteworthy contrast: where 
fiduciary duty law, beyond ritual incantations, does even less work than structural 
provisions of the bankruptcy system that may be designed as a pragmatic mitigation of 
these loyalty conflicts. 
Consider that the DIP-controlled debtor nominally holds the same fiduciary duties 
to creditors, albeit with some exceptions. First, the DIP (absent self-loathing) is unlikely 
to vigorously pursue actions against the debtor. Fortunately, the paradigmatic case from 
consumer bankruptcy of trustee v. debtor—an exemption fight—won’t arise in a 
corporate chapter 11 because corporations don’t get exemptions. Nonetheless, it would be 
foolish to deny the policy tension with the DIP serving as fiduciary for often 
antithetically situated stakeholders; few chapter 11 debtors enjoy rosy relations with their 
                                                                                                                                                 
obligation to administer and distribute estate’s property as “implicitly” providing basis 
for duty). 
94 No court wants to go so far as to say the trustee owes no loyalty duties to the debtor at 
all. Cf. CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985) (corporate debtor’s loyalty duty is 
to the “corporation”). And some courts have taken the debtor as co-beneficiary of 
fiduciary duty seriously. See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 
1987) (faulting trustee for taking easy settlement on appeal of judgment debtor was 
defending; complaining trustee was unduly focused on creditors’ risk-aversion, not 
debtor’s shareholder’s residual interest). 
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creditors when they file for bankruptcy.95 The Code responds to this structural tension 
with some built-in safety valves. First, the Code allows for DIP removal for “cause,” 
which includes incompetence and misconduct.96 Although incompetence more aptly 
invokes the fiduciary duty of care, the duty of loyalty is also implicated. For example, a 
glaring security interest imperfection—perhaps a lapsed financing statement—not 
pursued by the DIP would surely ground a motion to appoint a trustee as inexplicable 
secured creditor favoritism.97 
Now, who would cajole the DIP to bring such a motion?98 This question segues 
into the second chapter 11 safeguard: the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. As 
its name suggests, the Creditors Committee participates formally and may access the 
DIP’s records.99 It can weigh in on pending litigation and can even recommend 
approval/disapproval of a reorganization plan (and, when the exclusivity period expires, 
propose its own plan).100 Perhaps most importantly, it draws funding from the estate to 
employ counsel to scrutinize the DIP’s actions—a considerable henhouse check on the 
                                                 
95 Some suggest the tension is so stark as to make the fiduciary obligations questionable. 
See Kelch, supra note 20, at 1351–52, 1352 n.131. 
96 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
97 Cf. In re Biolitec, Inc., No. 13-11157, 2013 WL 1352302, at *9 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 3, 
2013) (appointing trustee when DIP declined to pursue glaring secured creditor 
preferences). 
98 Note that in chapter 13, there is dispute whether the debtor or standing trustee has 
standing to pursue lien avoidance given the chapter 13 debtor’s vesting in many of the 
trustee’s powers. Compare In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886, 900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) 
(debtor) with In re Binghi, 299 B.R. 300, 306 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (standing trustee). 
99 11 U.S.C. § 1103. 
100 Id. § 1121(c). 
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fox.101 Cases have explicitly held that the Committee can bring litigation otherwise 
available to the DIP if the DIP wrongly refuses to do so.102   
A final structural check is the bankruptcy court itself, which, by statute, must 
approve certain transactions that outside bankruptcy would escape scrutiny. For example, 
sale/use of estate property outside the ordinary course of business, or use of cash 
collateral, requires court approval.103 Thus, numerous Code provisions seem designed to 
acknowledge the intrinsic “external” loyalty tension of the DIP model’s fiduciary 
obligation to erstwhile adversaries. These offsetting checks also address “internal” 
loyalty conflicts by inserting the judge as arbiter, thus serving as a pragmatic response to 
the DIP’s conflicting allegiances (as opposed to relying on litigation to delineate the 
scope of the fiduciary duty of loyalty).104 
IV. Remedies 
Among the more convoluted topics in bankruptcy are the rules for when trustees 
can be sued for breaches of their duties (fiduciary and others). The case law is often 
contradictory, but some coherence emerges, and there is a recurrent theme of trustee 
solicitude, likely reflecting a recognition of the impossibility of the trustee serving every 
divergent constituent satisfactorily. 
To begin, however, we should pause to consider non-litigation sanctions. The 
U.S. Trustee’s office can strike trustees from their rolls and so repeat play/reputational 
                                                 
101 Id. §§ 330, 1103. 
102 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 319 B.R. 128, 132 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
103 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(2). 
104 See generally Bienenstock, supra note 62 (cataloging other DIP loyalty checks). 
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constraints provide strong administrative discipline.105 And trustees are required to post a 
bond for exercising their duties “faithful[ly],” which trigger forfeiture upon proper 
showing.106 Thus, even aside from case law, there are non-litigation constraints on trustee 
fiduciary behavior. Nonetheless, litigation abounds. Perhaps recognizing the conflict-
laden challenges trustees structurally face (and the baseline unhappiness of creditors in 
bankruptcy), numerous protective doctrines for trustees exist that should be understood 
before considering the grounds upon which trustees can be sued for breach. 
A. Defense: Immunities and Bars 
The principal issue in trustee litigation is the trustee’s personal liability. The 
trustee does, however, have standing to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate in her 
official capacity, which can be addressed quickly.107 
i. Official Capacity Bar: The Barton Doctrine 
  The two types of lawsuits the trustee officially pursues are actions of the 
debtor—causes to which the trustee succeeds as plaintiff—and actions for all creditors’ 
collective benefit, such as fraudulent conveyance suits.108 Lawsuits against the trustee in 
his official capacity face a jurisdictional common law bar called the Barton rule. In 
Barton v. Barbour, the Supreme Court established that suits against trustees in connection 
with estate administration require the appointing court’s leave.109 Accordingly, a state 
court tort action against the receiver in her official capacity had to be dismissed absent 
                                                 
105 28 C.F.R. § 58.6 (outlining suspension and termination procedures). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 322. Trustees (and their sureties) do indeed get burnt. See In re Schooler, 
449 B.R. 502, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 323; see also id. § 322(c) (immunizing trustee for debtor’s malfeasance). 
108 Id. §§ 541, 548. 
109 104 U.S. 126, 136–37 (1881). 
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the receiver court’s leave.110 Thus, as a pleading matter, most putative plaintiffs sue the 
trustee in their personal capacities.111 
ii. Personal Capacity Bar: The Derivative Immunity Doctrine 
Even if sued personally, a trustee can always assert immunity, which will also be 
grounds for denying Barton leave. This “absolute quasi-judicial immunity,” or immunity 
“derived” from the trustee’s appointing court, immunizes the trustee from suit within the 
scope of her official capacities.112 Courts uniformly extending this immunity to 
bankruptcy trustees build upon Supreme Court precedents on judicial immunity,113 which 
protect the free exercise of official discretion without fear of litigation.114 For example, 
trustees have an obligation (clearly institutional, not fiduciary) to refer to criminal 
prosecution conduct they believe is suspicious and so enjoy an absolute bar to malicious 
prosecution suit.115 
                                                 
110 See Villegas v. Schmidt, 788 F.3d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Barton 
doctrine).  
111 Congress has a statutory overlay, 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which clarifies that 
trustees/DIPs can be sued for “carrying on business.” This is refinement, not abrogation, 
of Barton, because it merely confers ordinary jurisdiction for civil suits (e.g., if the DIP 
enters and then breaches a contract to supply goods). See In re Crown Vantage, 421 F.3d 
963, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his limited exception [§ 959] applies only if the trustee or 
other officer is actually operating the business . . . .”). 
112 Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 
113 See, e.g., Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); Howard v. 
Leonard, 101 B.R. 421, 423 (D. N.J. 1989) (“[A] trustee’s immunity is derived from that 
afforded to the bankruptcy judge . . . .”); Gonzalez v. Musso, No. 08-CV-3026, 2008 WL 
3194179, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) (“[A] trustee will enjoy absolute immunity so 
long as he does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or at least acts under the 
supervision of the bankruptcy judge.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
114 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (“[T]he threat of liability can create 
perverse incentives that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their 
duties.”). 
115 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a). 
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  Not all exercises of trustee authority trigger derivative immunity. Which ones do 
depends upon classification along an “administrative/functional” to 
“judicial/discretionary” continuum, stemming from the Court’s decision in Forrester v. 
White,116 as refined by a more categorical historical two-part test in Antoine v. Byers & 
Anderson.117 This division follows from |the trustee’s immunity’s conceptual origin in 
judicial immunity, as not all judges’ actions enjoy absolute judicial immunity. (Forrester 
involved the judge demoting a probation officer, which was not an exercise of judicial 
power needing protection.118) Bankruptcy trustees, like judges, are “hybrid official[s]” 
who exercise some judicial-discretionary functions but also many administrative tasks, 
thus requiring case-by-case immunity analysis.119 
iii. Scope of the Duty Bar: The McNulta Doctrine (and 
Instructions Defense) 
Moreover, even if the trustee’s authority is on the non-judicial side of the 
Forrester-Antoine ledger and hence unprotected by derivative immunity, the trustee still 
enjoys alternative immunity from personal suit under the McNulta doctrine. Dating back 
to the Supreme Court case McNulta v. Lochridge,120 this additional immunity depends on 
the plaintiff: third parties are treated more dismissively than creditors to whom the trustee 
owes a fiduciary duty.121 If a third party sues the trustee in her personal capacity, the 
                                                 
116 484 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1988). 
117 508 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1993) (assessing “immunity historically accorded [to] the 
relevant official” and whether official’s discretionary judgments are “functionally 
comparable to that of a judge”) (internal citations omitted). 
118 484 U.S. at 230 (noting judge might enjoy qualified immunity). 
119 In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002). 
120 141 U.S. 327 (1891). 
121 See id. at 332. 
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trustee can assert McNulta, which immunizes the trustee for actions performed within the 
scope of his duties.122 The only exception is ultra vires conduct, i.e., that the trustee was 
acting outside the scope of his assigned responsibilities. Such cases are uncommon, but 
always interesting.123 
Finally, even if the trustee’s conduct is not immune under the foregoing doctrines, 
there is still one final bite at the apple: immunity by virtue of court approval. This 
doctrine harks back to the seminal case of Morris v. Darrow, in which the Supreme Court 
in finding a trustee liable for breach of fiduciary duty chided the trustee for not following 
“well established” practice in trust law of “seek[ing] instructions from the court, given 
upon notice to creditors and other interested parties, as to matters which involve difficult 
questions of judgment.”124 Building on this rationale, modern courts have granted trustees 
immunity when acting “with the explicit approval of a bankruptcy court . . . as long as 
there has been full and frank disclosure to creditors and the court.”125  
B. Offense: Standard of Care for Breach 
So what is left for a trustee to be sued upon in his personal capacity?  Breach of 
fiduciary duty. This is only available to “second party” plaintiffs, e.g., creditors to whom 
the bankruptcy trustee owes fiduciary obligations. But the extent of the trustee’s duty is 
once again unclear due to convoluted precedent. The cryptic Mosser case is to blame, and 
has caused a three-way circuit split. In Mosser, a railroad reorganization receiver poorly 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., In re Markos Gurnee P’ship, 182 B.R. 211, 216–17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). 
123 See, e.g., In re United Eng’g. & Contracting Co., 151 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1915) (finding trustee personally liable with no McNulta immunity for horses run amok 
absent authorization to run business). 
124 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951). 
125 In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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supervised his employees, who ended up trading in securities they sold the estate. The 
case is interesting because the trustee appeared hapless: he made no personal gain 
himself, just the faithless agents did. In fact, it’s not clear the estate itself lost money (the 
agents “merely” profited, although the Court acknowledged the estate’s foregone 
opportunity).126 
In holding the trustee liable, the Court used language that has puzzled subsequent 
analysts: “[W]e see no room for the operation of principles of negligence in a case in 
which conduct has been knowingly authorized.”127 In the Court’s view, this was an easy 
case of surcharging the trustee with personal liability because the agents were not going 
behind his back, but following a plan to trade securities the trustee himself innocently but 
unwisely approved. But “no room for negligence” could be read to mean that negligence 
should not be the relevant standard, only something higher, before a trustee is personally 
liable. Or it could mean that it was deferring the question of what level of culpability 
would need to be shown for a transgression of the duty of care, evincing trustee solicitude 
with comments like “[c]ourt[s] are quite likely to protect trustees against heavy liabilities 
for disinterested mistakes in business judgment” from “obstreperous creditors aided by 
hindsight.”128 Or something else.   
A three-way circuit split has indeed emerged trying to divine the standard for 
trustee liability—each claiming to draw support from Mosser’s terse opinion—with some 
courts seeing Mosser as requiring knowing/intentional wrongful conduct to predicate 
                                                 
126 See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951). 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 274. 
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trustee personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty;129 some requiring mere negligence 
in the discharge of duties (Mosser uses the fiduciary-laden term “surcharge”);130 and still 
others taking a middle ground of gross negligence (following the ignored 
recommendations of the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission).131 Some day, 
when it has smaller fish to fry, the Supreme Court will clear this up. 
V. Miscellaneous Issues with Fiduciary Duties in Insolvency 
As said, Section 704 is too long to explore in detail, but quick mention can be 
made of less prominent duties sometimes considered fiduciary. Specifically, the Code 
provides an explicit duty to account,132 a duty to collect and preserve assets,133 a duty to 
keep records,134 and a general duty to inform and respond.135 The open-court aspect of 
bankruptcy lessens the need of fiduciary duty law to compel free information flow,136 
and, indeed, this open-court nature renders any “duty to inquire” of the needs of 
represented litigants inapposite.137 The trustee also may statutorily delegate operation of 
the estate to professionals,138 but must submit a written resignation to the United States 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., In re Chicago Pac. Corp, 773 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985). This line of cases has 
been criticized for conflating trustee’s personal liability standards (finding the 
willful/intentional threshold required) with the trustee’s liability threshold for official 
liability, which, bizarrely, would be recoverable against the estate. See, e.g., McCullough, 
supra note 28, at 177–79 (citing E. Allan Tiller, Personal Liability of Trustees and 
Receivers in Bankruptcy, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 75, 100 (1979)). 
130 See, e.g., In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.3d 1339, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983). 
131 See, e.g., In re Smyth, 207 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 2000). 
132 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(2), (9). 
133 Id. at (a)(1). 
134 Id. at (a)(8). 
135 Id. at (a)(7). 
136 Id. at (a)(10). 
137 See, e.g., Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Mass. App. 1991). 
138 11 U.S.C. § 327. 
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Trustee to resign effectively.139 Case law has generally held that trustees may not 
delegate the “essential decision-making responsibility” of administering a case.140  
Finally, revisiting the DIP’s fiduciary duty in the (common) context of a corporate 
debtor is in order before concluding. General corporate law has its own concerns of 
agency challenges and temptations of corporate management exercising their fiduciary 
duties for shareholders.141 Under influential Delaware law, however, this duty to 
shareholders shifts to encompassing creditors as well when the corporation enters the 
zone of insolvency.142 Different systems saddle corporate fiduciaries with analogous 
responsibilities.143 While this doctrine has undergone some revision (and retrenchment) 
in recent cases, the proposition remains that shareholders lose their exclusive beneficiary 
status when this “zone” has been entered (which now appears to be restricted to just 
straight “insolvency”).144 
Legions of commentators in the corporate field have attacked and defended this 
duty-shifting rule,145 and the bankruptcy community has had its share of insights, too,146 
                                                 
139 See Handbook, supra note 33, at § 2.J, 6. 
140 In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc., 285 B.R. 191, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
141 See generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (1932) (exploring divided constituent loyalties). 
142 See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 83, at 1338 n.55. This doctrine finds historical 
pedigree in the trust fund doctrine that, prior to statutory regulation, policed improper 
corporate dividends from insolvent debtors. Id. at 1332–33. 
143 Id. at 1383 n.226, 1400 n.299. 
144 See id. at 1344 (explaining seminal Giahwalla case and nominal difference regarding 
derivative claims).  
145 See, e.g., Neil Ruben, Note, Duty to Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of 
Insolvency: Delaware and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 333, 351–57 (2010) 
(canvassing arguments for/against creditor derivative standing). 
146 See Kelch, supra note 20, at 1350–63 (discussing inherent conflict). Kelch proposes a 
prescriptive taxonomy that includes “Group Favoritism” (pick one constituency); 
“Diffuse Loyalty” (help everyone, through the corporation); and even “Stakeholder-
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including Texans Hu and Westbrook. They point out the poor fit of expanding fiduciary 
obligations to multiple stakeholders at state law, which they contend is ill-equipped 
institutionally to handle policing duties to multiple and antagonistic beneficiaries. Rather, 
say Professors Hu and Westbrook, expanding fiduciary duties to creditors when a 
corporation becomes insolvent (actually or just “zonally”) should be abandoned. No duty 
to creditors should obtain unless and until the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.147 This 
proposal is grounded in a belief that the bankruptcy system is better suited to handle the 
endemic conflicts of interest between corporate constituencies through the various 
bankruptcy-specific mechanisms discussed above, such as the corporation-funded 
creditors committee, the ability to displace wayward fiduciaries with an external trustee, 
and, most importantly, bankruptcy judge oversight, aided by an automatic stay that 
freezes all creditor conduct and corrals matters into her courtroom.148   
VI. Conclusion 
Whatever the generalizability of the Hu/Westbrook proposal beyond chapter 11, it 
is certainly the case that the Bankruptcy Code does indeed have many safeguards 
designed to confront conflicting creditor incentives, both against the DIP and inter se, in 
the swirling chaos of insolvency. While bankruptcy courts aren’t perfect, they are at least 
used to shifting allegiances and disalignments of interest in their everyday dockets. The 
Bankruptcy Code allows transparency of the process, committee watchdogs, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mediation” (remain neutral and transparent about fights). Kelch himself supports an 
Adversarial Model, contending that DIP discharge of corporate fiduciary duties is 
impossible. 
147 See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 83, passim. 
148 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 554. Hu and Westbrook indeed question whether corporate duties 
provide any meaningful discipline at all. See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 83, at 1391 
n.260. 
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replacement of the DIP fiduciary of “internal” loyalty with an external trustee all as an 
attempt to manage the challenging fiduciary obligation of “internal” loyalty in the tense 
context of general default. It may even do so more effectively than explicit litigation 
reliance on the fiduciary duties of loyalty and impartiality (with protective doctrines to 
spare the trustee from hindsight). Perhaps scholars of fiduciary duties in high-conflict 
environments could learn from bankruptcy’s pragmatic approach. 
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